ERISA and Arbitration: How Safe Is Your 401(k)? by Watson Moss, Kate
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 64 
Issue 2 Winter 2015: Twentieth Annual Clifford 
Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy - In 
Honor of Jack Weinstein 
Article 22 
ERISA and Arbitration: How Safe Is Your 401(k)? 
Kate Watson Moss 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Kate Watson Moss, ERISA and Arbitration: How Safe Is Your 401(k)?, 64 DePaul L. Rev. (2015) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol64/iss2/22 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
ERISA AND ARBITRATION:
HOW SAFE IS YOUR 401(K)?
Discourage litigation.  Persuade your neighbors to compromise
whenever you can.  Point out to them how the nominal winner is
often a real loser—in fees, expenses, and waste of time.
—Abraham Lincoln1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are an employee working for a mid-size corporation.
You are three years away from retirement, and you have been stash-
ing half of your paycheck into your employer-sponsored 401(k) for
years, eagerly anticipating the day you can clock out and retire.  This
is not a stretch of the imagination by any means—401(k) plans are
among the most popular employer-sponsored retirement plans in the
United States.2  Now imagine you, like many American workers, are
relying on your 401(k) to sustain you financially once you retire.  Un-
fortunately, it turns out that your employer misrepresented the secur-
ity of your 401(k) benefits, and your employment fund has decreased
significantly in value, as have the funds of your coworkers.3  What are
your options?
A recent line of Supreme Court cases4 suggests that if you and your
coworkers signed class action waivers and an agreement to arbitrate
individual claims arising under the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA),5 you have only one option: to participate
in arbitration.  This might even be the case if you never signed an
1. Abraham Lincoln, Notes for Law Lecture: About July 1, 1850, in 2 LIFE AND WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 194, 195 (Marion Mills Miller ed., 1907).
2. 401(k) Fast Facts, AM. BENEFITS COUNCIL, http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/docu
ments2013/401k_stats.pdf (updated Apr. 2014).
3. The actions of the employer in this hypothetical are adapted from Varity Corp. v. Howe,
516 U.S. 489 (1996).
4. See infra notes 112–187 and accompanying text.
5. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)).
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arbitration agreement6 pertaining to the management of your funds,7
but your investment manager8 did.
Scholars consistently view arbitration as a cost-saving alternative to
litigation.9  Benefits of arbitration include speedier resolutions, less
cumbersome court and evidence rules,10 and arbitration provides a
more confidential and less adversarial forum than courts.11  However,
there are some shortcomings to arbitration: it is more difficult to suc-
ceed on appeal, there is no right of discovery, there are no juries, and
most importantly, arbitrators might exhibit unknown bias and incom-
petency in resolving the disputes at issue.12
Arguably, the potential negatives associated with arbitration are es-
pecially salient in the ERISA context.  ERISA claims are often arbi-
trated, and employers are becoming more aware of the importance of
drafting arbitration clauses in ERISA agreements.13  These clauses are
often included in ERISA agreements without the employee benefi-
ciaries14 even knowing about them.  For example, because pension
and welfare plans are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining,
plans governed by ERISA are commonly included in collective bar-
gaining agreements.15  These agreements frequently contain provi-
sions requiring binding arbitration of disputes that arise under the
6. In this Comment, I use the terms “arbitration agreement” (an agreement to arbitrate found
in a contract) and “arbitration clause” (a clause in which the parties to the contract agree to
arbitrate disputes, as opposed to litigating in court) interchangeably.  When referring to arbitra-
tion agreements found in the documents that are used to include an employee in an ERISA
retirement plan, I refer to the plan documents themselves as “ERISA agreements.”
7. That is, an agreement between the plan provider (an employer) and a company that will
manage the investment funds to ensure strong returns.  This is separate from an agreement to
join an employer’s 401(k) (referred to as “ERISA agreements” in this Comment).
8. In this Comment, I use the term “investment manager” and “investment adviser” inter-
changeably.  I also make reference to “investment management companies,” which serve the
same function as an investment manager.
9. Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute
Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, in ALTERNATIVE DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA 511, 518 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn
eds., 2004).
10. Arthur Mazirow, Presentation to the Counselors of Real Estate: The Advantages and Dis-
advantages of Arbitration as Compared to Litigation 1 (Apr. 13, 2008), available at http://www
.cre.org/images/MY08/presentations/The_Advantages_And_Disadvantages_of_Arbitration_As_
Compared_to_Litigation_2_Mazirow.pdf.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Chrys A. Martin, Effective Arbitration of ERISA Claims Disputes, IN-HOUSE DEF. Q.,
Summer 2012, at 44–47.
14. In this Comment, I use the terms “plan beneficiary” and “employee beneficiary”
interchangeably.
15. Richard P. Donaldson, The Use of Arbitration To Avoid Litigation Under ERISA, 17 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 215, 216 (1976).
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collective bargaining agreement.16  Similarly, investment advisers
often participate in the management of retirement plans, which can be
litigated under ERISA, pursuant to an investment management agree-
ment between the plan provider17 and an investment manager.18
These common scenarios suggest increased scrutiny is warranted when
the court determines whether to compel arbitration because of an al-
leged ERISA violation.  These scenarios also suggest that there might
be serious legal issues surrounding enforcement of arbitration
clauses—namely, the lack of privity between contracting parties.19
This Comment examines the use of class action waivers and arbitra-
tion clauses in ERISA agreements and argues against the use of arbi-
tration or waiver in class action ERISA suits.  Part II provides an
overview of the relevant law, including background information on
ERISA, the Federal Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court’s rulings on
arbitration clauses, and the current state of the law regarding arbitra-
tion and ERISA.20  Part III provides an analysis of the arguments for
and against the use of arbitration clauses and class action waivers in
ERISA agreements.21  Finally, Part IV provides an analysis of the
practical implications of arbitration clauses in the ERISA context and
connects legal theory with practical use.22  Part IV also addresses the
potential impact of widespread use of arbitration clauses in the ER-
ISA context of employee beneficiaries.23
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
ERISA is a federal law that establishes minimum standards for pen-
sion plans in private industry and provides extensive rules on the fed-
eral income tax effect of transactions associated with employee
benefit plans.24  Therefore, any private employer that implements a
pension plan for its employees must comply with the requirements of
ERISA.25  Furthermore, when an employer creates and maintains a
16. Id.
17. In this Comment, I use the terms “plan provider,” “ERISA plan provider,” and “employer
plan provider” interchangeably.
18. See, e.g., Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).
19. See, e.g., id. at 1102.
20. See infra notes 24–187 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 188–280 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 282–296 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 282–296 and accompanying text.
24. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (2012).
776 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:773
financial benefit plan for its employees, ERISA creates a fiduciary re-
lationship between those parties.26  Accordingly, if an employer
breaches its fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of a plan it sponsors,
the employee can sue the employer in federal court.27
Employers that maintain employee pension funds often hire outside
consultants to help them determine where to invest their money.28
According to a survey conducted in 2011, 94% of pension funds were
managed by investment managers or financial consultants.29  While
some have suggested that investment managers are often used to de-
flect negative attention when investments go sour,30 evidence suggests
that managers with experience and knowledge of both investing and
ERISA are needed to meet the complex requirements of the fiduciary
responsibilities imposed by ERISA on plan providers.31
ERISA claims are based on statutory law,32 which makes them es-
pecially well suited to arbitration, where the arbitrator needs only to
interpret the statute without extensive incorporation of case law.33
Additionally, ERISA’s statutory scheme includes strong preemption
of state law claims.34  Because ERISA preempts state law, state legis-
lators who want to limit arbitration by enacting legislation that invali-
dates arbitration clauses will be unsuccessful.35  This dynamic ensures
that arbitration of ERISA claims will be able to proceed in spite of
state attempts to curtail the enforcement of these types of contract
clauses.36
26. § 1001(b).
27. § 1109.
28. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Doubts Raised on Advice Pensions Get, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2013, at
B1.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Meeting Your Fiduciary Responsibilities, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
publications/fiduciaryresponsibility.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014).
32. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)).
33. Alexis Mourre et al., Arbitral Jurisprudence in International Commercial Arbitration,
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (May 28, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/05/28/arbitral-
jurisprudence-in-international-commercial-arbitration-the-case-for-a-systematic-publication-of-
arbitral-awards-in-10-questions%E2%80%A6/.
34. Philip B. Ytterberg, ERISA: Arbitration Now an Accepted Alternative to Litigation, MET-
ROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Aug. 2005, at 17, available at www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2005/
August/17.pdf.
35. Supreme Court Issues Two Important Rulings, FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP (Feb. 20, 2008),
http://www.laborlawyers.com/supreme-court-issues-two-important-rulings [hereinafter FISHER &
PHILLIPS].
36. Id.
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B. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) requires that courts
recognize and enforce arbitration agreements and awards.37  The
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA as establishing
a “federal policy favoring arbitration.”38  Pursuant to the FAA, when
the parties to an agreement have agreed to arbitrate a federal statu-
tory claim, the claim is subject to arbitration “unless Congress itself
has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue.”39  In essence, the FAA preempts federal
and state laws that limit the enforcement of arbitration agreements in
order to achieve the goals of “favor[ing] enforcement of private agree-
ments to arbitrate” and “eliminat[ing] traditional judicial hostility to
arbitration and other roadblocks to the speedy and efficient resolution
of disputes.”40
In recent years, arbitration agreements that contain class action
waivers have become increasingly controversial.41  In 2003, the Su-
preme Court held that arbitrators have the authority to determine
“whether a contract allows class proceedings in arbitration if the con-
tract is silent on the issue.”42  In reaction, fearing the uncertainty of
class action arbitration, corporate defendants began including class ac-
tion waivers in their contracts.43  Class action waivers are used in con-
tracts to prevent someone from filing a class action lawsuit.44  “When
a person signs a class action waiver, they are no longer allowed to join
other people who are suing for the same issue.”45  Class action waivers
are often found in arbitration agreements.46  Consequently, when
someone signs a contract containing both an arbitration agreement for
individual claims and a class action waiver, the individual will not be
able to file a suit related to that contract on either an individual or
37. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(2012)).
38. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
39. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. FISHER & PHILLIPS, supra note 35.  For more information on how the FAA has been found
to preempt state law, see infra notes 112–187 and accompanying text.
41. Gregory C. Cook & A. Kelly Brennan, The Enforceability of Class Action Waivers in
Consumer Agreements, 40 UCC L.J. 331, 333 (2008).
42. Id. (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003)).
43. Id.
44. Class Action / Arbitration Waivers, FAIR CONTRACTS.ORG, http://www.faircontracts.org/con
tract-provisions/class-action-arbitration-waivers (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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classwide basis.47  The use of class action waivers is especially salient
in the ERISA context, as many cases involving employee benefit plans
are structured as class actions, with classes made up of plan
beneficiaries.48
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s interpretation that federal
policy favors arbitration, there is an active and ongoing debate as to
whether arbitration is a positive alternative to litigation.49  This sec-
tion outlines the arguments presented on both sides of the debate.  On
the one hand, arbitration is considered a positive alternative to litiga-
tion.  Arbitration is often heralded as a less expensive way for parties
to come to a satisfactory resolution of claims.50  It is widely accepted
that arbitration leads to lower dispute resolution costs.51  Addition-
ally, arbitration rules and procedures are simpler than those that gov-
ern litigation proceedings.52  In fact, according to a survey of adult
arbitration participants, 63% of those polled found arbitration simpler
than going to court.53  The evidentiary rules that govern arbitration
are less stringent than those that govern trial proceedings.54  Addition-
ally, arbitration is largely seen as increasing overall judicial effi-
ciency.55  Lastly, arbitration often comes to a resolution more quickly
47. Id.
48. Steuart H. Thomsen, ERISA Class Actions, BRIEF, Summer 1999, at 36, 36 (a publication
from the Tort and Insurance Practice Section of the A.B.A.).  For more information on the
structural and procedural underpinnings of ERISA class action claims, see id. at 36–45.
49. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Priva-
tizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521
(2005); Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analy-
sis, 8 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 209 (2000); Maureen A. Weston, Symposium, Preserving the
Federal Arbitration Act by Reining in Judicial Expansion and Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J. 385
(2007) (The symposium, held by the Nevada Law Journal, focused exclusively on the benefits
and downfalls of a comprehensive arbitration scheme in the modern American legal field.);
Donna M. Bates, Note, A Consumer’s Dream or Pandora’s Box: Is Arbitration a Viable Option
for Cross-Border Consumer Disputes?, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 823 (2004).
50. See Ytterberg, supra note 34.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, A SURVEY CONDUCTED FOR THE U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, ARBITRATION: SIMPLER, CHEAPER, AND FASTER THAN LITIGATION 5 (Apr. 2005),
available at http://www.adrforum.com\rcontrol\documents\researchstudiesandstatistics\2005
harrispoll.pdf.
54. Michael Z. Green, Essay, No Strict Evidence Rules in Labor and Employment Arbitration,
15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 533, 533 (2009) (“Since arbitrators are not bound by the strict rules
of evidence applicable in court, there originally developed a practice of admitting hearsay ‘for
what it is worth.’” (quoting In re Barton Ctr., Senior Health Mgmt., LLP, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 249, 253 (2005) (Kravit, Arb.)).
55. Jay R. Sever, Comment, The Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public Policy Checks on
U.S. and Foreign Arbitration: Arbitration Out of Control?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1661, 1667–68 (1991).
American courts, led by recent landmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, have
moved from a hostile and jealous attitude towards the institution of arbitration to al-
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than litigation.56  For example, the median length of time from filing
an arbitration demand to an award in 2008 was 7.9 months.57  In con-
trast, the length of time from filing a lawsuit to trial in the Seventh
Circuit in 2010 was 25.4 months.58
On the other hand, there are significant shortcomings to arbitration.
Unlike a court ruling, arbitration rulings cannot be directly appealed
without first returning to the court system.59  An arbitration ruling is
set aside only if a party can prove that the arbitrator was biased or
that the arbitrator’s decision violated public policy.60  Furthermore,
discovery is often more limited in arbitration than it would be in litiga-
lowing and enforcing almost any arbitration agreement . . . .  A more recent (and argua-
bly dangerous) undercurrent in the Court’s rationale is a nearly absolute deference to
arbitration, apparently for purposes of judicial efficiency.  The judicial efficiency ratio-
nale appears to be peculiar to the United States.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
56. See Green, supra note 54, at 541–43 (balancing the advantages of arbitration, relatively
lower costs and quicker resolution, against the need for stricter rules of evidence in arbitration);
see also A.B.A. SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, BENEFITS OF ARBITRATION FOR COMMER-
CIAL DISPUTES 2–3 [hereinafter BENEFITS OF ARBITRATION], http://www.americanbar.org/con
tent/dam/aba/events/dispute_resolution/committees/arbitration/arbitrationguide.authcheckdam
.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
According to statistics furnished by the largest arbitration providers, the average
time from commencement of a domestic, commercial arbitration to issuance of a final
award ranges from 7 months to 7.3 months.
By contrast, in 2011, the median length of time from filing through trial of civil cases
in the U.S. District Courts was 23.4 months and considerably longer in some of the
busier courts.
The median length of time in 2011 form filing of a civil case in district court to dispo-
sition of appeal by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal was 30.8 months and considerably
longer in some of the busier courts.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Furthermore,
It is axiomatic that the general purpose of private arbitration is to avoid the pitfalls of
formal litigation.  Arbitration is thus intended to provide for a more efficient and expe-
ditious process than that afforded by formal litigation in which procedural measures
such as discovery and extended motion practice can substantially protract and compli-
cate the resolution of the parties’ dispute.
James M. Gaitis, International and Domestic Arbitration Procedure: The Need for a Rule Provid-
ing a Limited Opportunity for Arbitral Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 9, 84 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
57. BENEFITS OF ARBITRATION, supra note 56, at 3.
58. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS: ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 175, 176 tbl. C-5 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/us
courts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/appendices/C05Sep10.pdf.
59. CPR Arbitration Appeal Procedure and Commentary, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVEN-
TION & RESOL., http://www.cpradr.org/Portals/0/Resources/ADR%20Tools/Clauses%20&%20
Rules/CPR%20Arbitration%20Appeal%20Procedure.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2014).
60. Id.
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tion.61  Also, in some cases, the costs of arbitration can rise to the
costs of litigation—there have been cases where courts have invali-
dated arbitration agreements on the grounds that the costs of arbitra-
tion were prohibitive.62  For example, the cost to initiate an arbitration
claim is almost always higher than the cost to file a claim in court.63
Additionally, because arbitration does not guarantee that the parties
will stay out of court, the parties may have to pay to defend their
claims twice—first in arbitration, and then at trial if the arbitration
award is unsatisfactory.64
Arguably, the use of mandatory arbitration raises significant due
process concerns because judicial “review of arbitration awards . . . is
extremely limited.”65  Arbitration places important decision-making
power in the hands of an arbitrator who is normally not elected or
accountable to the community where the arbitration occurs.66  There
is no governmental accountability for arbitrators if they abuse their
discretion; unlike judges, they are normally not elected or appointed
by elected officials.67  An arbitrator is not a jury, so she is not account-
able to the community where the arbitration is held.  Agreements cov-
ered by ERISA are also seen as contracts of adhesion,68 “where one
party significantly dominates the other so that there is no negotiation
61. Under § 7 of the FAA, arbitrators are granted subpoena powers equivalent to those of a
court of law.  9 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (“The arbitrators . . . may summon . . . any person.”).  However,
the federal courts are divided on whether this section authorizes arbitrators to subpoena nonpar-
ties for purposes of discovery. Compare Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d
404, 407 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Section 7’s language unambiguously restricts an arbitrator’s subpoena
power to situations in which the non-party has been called to appear in the physical presence of
the arbitrator and to hand over the documents at that time.”), with Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Celanese
AG, 430 F.3d 567, 581 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We decide only that Section 7 unambiguously authorizes
arbitrators to summon non-party witnesses to give testimony and provide material evidence
before an arbitration panel . . . .”).
62. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89–90 (2000) (“It may well
be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively
vindicating her federal rights in the arbitral forum.”); Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d
267, 286 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a predispute arbitration clause may be unconscionable if
the fess to initiate the arbitration process are unaffordable).
63. The Costs of Arbitration, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/publications/publicationre
direct.cfm?ID=7173 (last visited Aug. 19, 2014).
64. Id.
65. Denise M. Barton, The Evolution of Punitive Damage Awards in Securities Arbitration:
Has the Use of Punitive Damages Rendered the Arbitration Forum Inequitable?, 70 TUL. L. REV.
1537, 1557-60 (1996) (“The review of arbitration awards . . . is extremely limited.  In light of this
limited review, commentators have raised concerns about whether the review procedures for
[arbitration awards] satisfy due process.”).
66. Why Binding Interest Arbitration Is Bad, For BOTH Sides, STRIKE FACTS, http://strike
facts.com/analysis/binding-arbitration/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
67. Id.
68. Id. “Contracts of adhesion are form contracts, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, usu-
ally by a seller of a good or service.”  Andrew Tutt, Note, On the Invalidation of Terms in Con-
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of terms.”69  Unlike a trial, which provides a public forum, arbitration
serves to “hide” consumer gripes with corporations, making it a “lousy
conflict resolution tool” because it limits corporate accountability.70
Lastly, there are pitfalls to arbitration specific to ERISA claims.
First, the statutory language of ERISA is incredibly complex and con-
fusing.71  Arguably, arbitrators might be unable to comprehend the
breadth and specificity of the statute,72 whereas federal judges have
repeat exposure to ERISA litigation—a federal statute—and the re-
source of clerks to aid their understanding. Arbitrators are also not
bound by case law or judicial interpretations.73  As such, arbitration
agreements untether claims from federal court rules or precedent,
which makes claims under ERISA more unpredictable.74  Addition-
ally, ERISA agreements can specify that arbitrators must adopt deci-
sions or factual issues pursuant to the determinations of plan
providers.75  This means that employers can preemptively stipulate
facts that may or may not be at issue, to the detriment of the em-
ployee bringing suit.  Lastly, courts almost always enforce an arbitra-
tor’s award, even in spite of obvious mistakes.76  This “abuse of
tracts of Adhesion, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 439, 441 (2013) (citation omitted).  ERISA agreements
are seen as contracts of adhesion:
It is clear that Congress accepted the unilateral contractual theory for establishing
the right to benefits.  A large portion of ERISA merely specifies what must be included
in the contract. This is the traditional legislative approach to regulating adhesion con-
tracts. . . . In sum, Congress recognized the employee benefit plan as a sort of unilateral
adhesion contract that gives rise to fiduciary duties on the part of the dominant party.
George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan Interpretation,
32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 955, 988 (1995) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
69. Id. at 1002.  Because these contracts of adhesion include waiving the right to sue in
court—a part of due process—they are troubling. See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Grav-
ity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 949, 1031 (2000) (“Indeed, [the proliferation of arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion]
is arguably the fastest growing aspect of arbitration today—and the most troubling, given the
gravity of rights being waived and the potential for abuse.” (emphasis added)).
70. Id.; see also Camille A. Laturno, Comment, International Arbitration of the Creative: A
Look at the World Intellectural Property Organization’s New Arbitration Rules, 9 TRANSNAT’L L.
357, 379-80 (1996) (“[C]onfidentiality is one of the benefits of arbitration, regardless of which
arbitral institution is selected.”).
71. James P. Baker, Requiem for ERISA Class Actions?, BENEFITS L.J., Summer 2012, at 86,
91.
72. See Franck, supra note 49, at 1595, 1608 (arguing that the credibility of the arbitration
system is “enhanced by calling on those individuals with the requisite legal and technical
expertise”).
73. See generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895 (2010).
74. Baker, supra note 71, at 91.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 92.
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discretion” standard of review is much more forgiving than the de
novo standard applied to ERISA cases in litigation.77
While ERISA is thought to have strong preemptory characteris-
tics,78 ERISA does not preempt arbitration79 because ERISA falls
under the scope of the FAA.80  This idea is supported by the argument
that because Congress did not exclude ERISA from the scope of arbi-
tration under the FAA, preemption must be permitted.81  This pro-
position is also supported by the legislative history of the Act.82
ERISA’s legislative history states that “Congress sought ‘to protect
. . . participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries’ . . .
‘by providing ready access to the Federal Courts.’”83  This assertion
has been seen as mostly jurisdictional, and comports with antitrust leg-
islation, which is frequently arbitrated.  Consequently, where an ER-
ISA agreement includes an arbitration agreement (supported by the
FAA), employee beneficiaries subject to arbitration agreements will
be unable to avoid arbitration on preemption grounds.84
At one point, courts were hesitant to allow arbitration of ERISA
claims for three reasons: (1) arbitrators lack the competence to inter-
pret complicated statutes like ERISA;85 (2) arbitrators are inappropri-
ate decision makers in ERISA cases because they are not bound to
consider law or precedent in their decisions;86 and (3) contracts tend
to be entered into on behalf of consumers by investment managers or
collective bargaining agreements, which raises issues of privity be-
77. Id. at 91.
78. See Charles S. Mitchell, Note, ERISA: Does Independent Medical Review of Benefit Deni-
als Clear the ERISA Preemption Hurdle in the Sixth Circuit?, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 865, 869 (2004)
(“Like many federal statutory schemes, ERISA contains an express preemption provision that
ERISA ‘shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan . . . . ’” (quoting 29 U.S.C § 1001(a) (2004)).
79. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 386–87 (2002) (holding that
a state law, which creates a review process that resembles arbitration, is not preempted by ER-
ISA and noting that ERISA-related inquiries such as conducting hearings and requiring the
submission of evidence and cross-examination to construe contract terms are germane to arbitra-
tion).  While the Supreme Court has not held that the FAA preempts ERISA, the majority of
courts take the position that it does.  Simon v. Pfizer Inc., 398 F.3d 765, 774 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“[T]he majority of courts considering this issue have held that disputes arising under ERISA . . .
are subject to arbitration under the FAA.”).
80. See discussion supra note 79.
81. See Ytterberg, supra note 34.
82. Id.
83. Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988)).
84. Simon, 398 F.3d at 773 (“[A] compulsory arbitration provision divests the District Court
of jurisdiction over claims that seek benefits under an ERISA plan . . . .”).
85. Amaro v. Cont’l Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1984).
86. Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 941 (3d Cir. 1985).
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tween parties.87  Today, the hesitation surrounding ERISA arbitration
has all but vanished, as demonstrated by the rulings of the circuit
courts discussed below.
C. The Circuit Courts: ERISA and Mandatory Arbitration
The majority of the circuit courts have embraced arbitration clauses
in ERISA agreements.  The First Circuit Court of Appeals has not
formally addressed the issue, but district courts within the Circuit have
held that Congress did not intend to exclude actions arising under ER-
ISA from arbitration pursuant to the FAA.88  The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held the same.89  A district court within the
Fourth Circuit deferred to “the strong federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion.”90  The Second Circuit has held that the FAA requires enforce-
ment of an arbitration clause in an ERISA agreement, and that
ERISA’s text and legislative history do not support a conclusion that
Congress intended to preclude arbitration of ERISA claims.91  The
Fifth92 and Tenth93 Circuits have adopted similar reasoning.  The
Third Circuit reversed its position in 1993, holding that claims of ER-
ISA violations are subject to mandatory arbitration when the parties
have agreed to arbitrate.94  The Sixth Circuit adopted a narrower in-
terpretation, holding that only ERISA claims enumerated within the
scope of an arbitration clause are subject to arbitration and that all
other claims can proceed to court.95  While the Seventh Circuit has
not directly dealt with “the applicability of the FAA to ERISA litiga-
tion, it has upheld arbitration clauses where the allegations are prima-
rily ERISA based.”96
87. See, e.g., Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2006).  Privity of contract refers to
parties who have a direct contractual relationship—in other words, the parties to a contract.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1320 (9th ed. 2009).  In the ERISA context, the two parties to the
hypothetical plan agreement discussed in the Introduction to this Comment would be the invest-
ment manager or advisor and the employee.  If the employer raised the issue of enforcement of
the arbitration clause, the employee could assert a defense based on privity of contract, stating
that no agreement was entered into with the employer because there was no privity between the
parties.
88. See, e.g., Williams v. HealthAlliance Hosps., Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161 (D. Mass. 2001).
89. Arnulfo P. Sulit, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1988);
Kropfelder v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 859 F. Supp. 952, 956 (D. Md. 1994).
90. Kropfelder, 859 F. Supp. at 955.
91. Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 121–22 (2d Cir. 1991).
92. Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080, 1084 (5th Cir. 1996).
93. Williams v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758, 766 (10th Cir. 2000).
94. Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1111–12 (3d Cir.
1993).
95. Simon v. Pfizer Inc., 398 F.3d 765, 777 (6th Cir. 2005).
96. Bd. of Trs. v. Linder, No. 02 C 50182, 2002 WL 31061336, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2002)
(citing Challenger v. Local Union No. 1, 619 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1980)).
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The sole outlier is the Ninth Circuit.  The Ninth Circuit refuses to
bind employees to an arbitration agreement to which they are not
privy, even if an investment manager signed the agreement on behalf
of the employee.  In the Ninth Circuit’s central case on this issue,
Comer v. Micor, Inc.,97 the plan beneficiary to the employee pension
and profit-sharing plans sued the employer’s investment manager, al-
leging a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.98  The Comer court
held that a plan beneficiary could not be bound to an arbitration
agreement between an investment manager and the employer because
the plan beneficiary was not privy to the contract.99  This position,
when coupled with Amaro v. Continental Can Co. (holding that arbi-
trators are not capable of handling the complex issues embedded in
the statutory language of ERISA),100 arguably makes the Ninth Cir-
cuit a hostile forum for employers.
Despite establishing an unwillingness to intervene between em-
ployee plan providers and beneficiaries, the Comer court acknowl-
edged that the employer and the investment manager agreed that the
claim would have been fine to go to arbitration had it been brought by
the employer rather than a beneficiary.101  If the employer or the in-
vestment manager had brought the claim (which is unlikely), there
would have been privity between both parties.  Furthermore, the
Comer decision intimates that the Ninth Circuit, noting the newness of
this issue, might join the other circuits in allowing arbitration of ER-
ISA fiduciary claims the next time the issue is presented and casts
some doubt on the stability of this field of law in the Ninth Circuit.102
Specifically, the court held that a nonsignatory to a contract could be
subject to an arbitration clause if she “knowingly exploits the agree-
ment containing the arbitration clause despite having never signed the
agreement.”103  Additionally, the Comer decision was made prior to
the Supreme Court cases that bolstered the strength of arbitration
agreements.104  Consequently, it is possible that an investment adviser
could present evidence that the signatories intended to give non-
signatory beneficiaries the right to sue under the agreement, which
97. 436 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2006).
98. Id. at 1099–1100.
99. See id. at 1103–04.
100. Amaro v. Cont’l Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir 1984).
101. Comer, 436 F.3d at 1101.
102. Id. at 1100–01.
103. Id. at 1101 (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin
Intermediates, 269 F.3d 187, 199 (3d Cir. 2001)).
104. Specifically, these cases are AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753
(2011), and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013),
discussed supra notes 157–187 and accompanying text.
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would allow arbitration of these kinds of claims.105  However, for the
time being, Comer106 and Amaro107 remain good law in the Ninth
Circuit.
Currently, no published decisions directly address the enforceability
of class action waivers under ERISA.  In Hornsby v. Macon County
Greyhound Park Inc.,108 an unpublished decision, the Middle District
of Alabama recently touched on the issue, compelling arbitration of a
class action ERISA claim.109  In Hornsby, the court held that an arbi-
tration agreement precluded a class action claim, rejecting the plain-
tiffs’ argument that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable
under Alabama law to preclude class action claims when it would be
more efficient to proceed as a class.110  Other than this decision, no
other case has acknowledged an ERISA class action claim, despite
steady increases in employment class action cases and settlements in
the last few years.111
D. Recent Evolution: The Supreme Court and Arbitration Clauses
The Supreme Court has a long history of ruling on the side of en-
forcement of arbitration clauses.112  The Supreme Court has held that
the FAA preempts state law, even when the state has expressed a
clear intent of bypassing arbitration in certain contexts.113  Further,
the law has expanded over the last ten years to enforce arbitration
105. Id.; see also Need To Seek Arbitration, 2 EMP. COORD. BENEFITS § 4534 (2015).
Additionally,
For its part, the Comer court also noted that past Ninth Circuit decisions had seemingly
ignored Supreme Court precedent . . . on the applicability of the FAA to ERISA
claims, even though the Ninth Circuit has enforced arbitration clauses concerning other
statutory claims that held antitrust and Lanham Act claims arbitrable.  The Comer deci-
sion suggests that the Ninth Circuit may join the other circuits in allowing arbitration of
ERISA fiduciary claims the next time the issue is presented.
Baker, supra note 71, at 90–91 (footnotes omitted).
106. Comer, 436 F.3d 1098.
107. Amaro, 724 F.2d 747.
108. No. 3:10cv680–MHT, 2012 WL 2135470 (M.D. Ala. June 13, 2012) (order compelling
arbitration).
109. Id. at *2–4.
110. Id. at *9–10.
111. According to one estimate, ERISA class action settlements increased to $1.16 billion in
2010.  Gerald Maatman, Jr., The 2011 Workplace Class Action Report Is Here, WORKPLACE
CLASS ACTION BLOG (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.workplaceclassaction.com/2011/01/the-2011-
workplace-class-action-report-is-here/.
112. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346,
362–63 (2008); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 448–49 (2006); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
113. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
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clauses in contracts, even when contracts may have been entered into
without equal bargaining power and the use of arbitration would de-
prive a plaintiff of her day in court.114
This section discusses the major evolution of Supreme Court juris-
prudence in the area of arbitration clause enforcement.  The first, Gil-
mer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,115 involves an employment
dispute where the employee had, as part of his professional registra-
tion, agreed to arbitrate disputes between the employee and the em-
ployer.116  The second, Preston v. Ferrer,117 involves the intersection of
state law and the FAA, establishing a clear-cut policy of the FAA pre-
empting state law, despite clear indications of statewide public policy
by the state legislature.118  The third, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion,119 involves the enforcement of class action waivers—which effec-
tively waive the ability to proceed with a class action claim—even in
situations when the contract at issue is adhesive and an arbitration
agreement precludes individual litigation.120 The fourth, American Ex-
press Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,121 reaffirms the logic of the
third case by enforcing a class action waiver found in an arbitration
agreement, even though doing so would essentially and effectively
protect the defendant from antitrust suits.122  Together, these cases es-
tablish the enforceability of agreements containing both an arbitration
agreement and class action waivers, regardless of principles of con-
scionability, public policy, or state directive.  These cases, considered
longitudinally, bring the Supreme Court’s preference for arbitration
over litigation into clear focus.
i. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (Interstate) hired Robert Gilmer as
a Manager of Financial Services in May 1981.123  The terms of his em-
ployment required him to register as a securities representative with
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).124  The NYSE registration
form required Mr. Gilmer to agree to “arbitrate any dispute, claim or
114. See cases cited supra note 112.
115. 500 U.S. 20.
116. See infra notes 123–135 and accompanying text.
117. 552 U.S. 364.
118. See infra notes 136–156 and accompanying text.
119. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2013).
120. See infra notes 157–176 and accompanying text.
121. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
122. See infra notes 177–187 and accompanying text.
123. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
124. Id.
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controversy” arising between him and Interstate, forfeiting his right to
sue Interstate in court.125
In 1987, Interstate fired Mr. Gilmer, then 62 years old.126  Mr. Gil-
mer filed an age discrimination claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and brought suit in federal court.127  Inter-
state sought enforcement of the NYSE registration form arbitration
agreement.128  The United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of North Carolina denied Interstate’s motion to compel arbitra-
tion.129  The Fourth Circuit reversed, stating that “an arbitration
agreement is unenforceable [under the FAA] only if Congress has
evinced an intention to preclude waiver of the judicial forum for a
particular statutory right, or if the agreement was procured by fraud
or use of excessive economic power.”130
In a seven-to-two decision, the Supreme Court held that the arbitra-
tion agreement should be enforced.131  The Court noted that there
was unequal bargaining power between Mr. Gilmer and Interstate/
NYSE.132  However, the mere existence of inequality in bargaining
power was not a sufficient reason to rule that the arbitration agree-
ment was unenforceable in the employment context.133  Further, the
only defenses available to invalidate arbitration agreements are those
that prevent the formation of contracts, “save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”134  It is
worth mentioning here that privity of contract would constitute one of
those defenses.
In essence, the Court in Gilmer held that unless Congress explicitly
precludes arbitration or the use of other nonjudicial means for resolv-
ing claims, the FAA stands.135  This decision was a major win for em-
ployers wanting to avoid expensive and costly litigation arising from
employment issues.
125. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 24.
129. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (“The District Court denied Interstate’s motion . . . because it
concluded that Congress intended to protect . . . claimants [under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act] from the waiver of a judicial forum.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
130. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196–97 (4th Cir. 1990).
131. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
132. Id. at 32–33.
133. Id. at 33.
134. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Id. at 35.
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ii. Preston v. Ferrer
The holding in Gilmer was bolstered by Preston v. Ferrer.136  Alex
Ferrer, star of daytime television’s “Judge Alex” show, and his former
manager, Arnold Preston, were engaged in a dispute over payment for
management services.137  Ironically, Judge Alex served as an arbitra-
tor hearing small-claim legal disputes on his TV show.138  Judge Alex
was a Florida state judge and former prosecutor.139  Preston was an
attorney providing management services.140  In 2002, Judge Alex and
Preston entered into a contract stating that Preston would provide
“personal management services” in exchange for 12% of Ferrer’s
earnings from the TV show.141  The arbitration clause in the contract
limited any dispute about the contract to arbitration.142  In 2005, Pres-
ton initiated arbitration proceedings against Judge Alex seeking to re-
cover the management fees under the contract.143  Judge Alex filed a
petition to stay the arbitration proceedings144 and filed a claim with
the California Labor Commission, arguing that the entire contract was
void under the Talent Agencies Act (TAA),145 a California law.146
The arbitrator denied Judge Alex’s motion to stay the arbitration, and
Judge Alex filed suit in state court seeking (1) a declaration that the
contract dispute was not subject to arbitration; and (2) to restrain
Preston from proceeding with arbitration.147  The trial court denied
Preston’s motion to compel arbitration, and granted Judge Alex’s mo-
tion to stay the action pending final resolution by the Commis-
sioner.148  The court of appeals affirmed.149
136. 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
137. Id. at 350–52.
138. Ferrer v. Preston, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 630 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Plaintiff is a former Florida
Superior Court Judge, who now works arbitrating legal disputes on the television program, Judge
Alex, on the Fox television network.”), rev’d, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
139. FISHER & PHILLIPS, supra note 35.
140. Preston, 552 U.S. at 350.
141. FISHER & PHILLIPS, supra note 35.
142. Preston, 552 U.S. at 350.
143. Id.
144. Ferrer v. Preston, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 630 (Ct. App. 2007) (“On July 1, 2005, plaintiff
filed a motion to stay the arbitration with the arbitrator.  Plaintiff also filed a Petition to Deter-
mine Controversy with the Labor Commissioner and a motion asking the Commissioner to stay
the arbitration.”).
145. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700–1700.47 (West 2011).  The TAA regulates the activities of tal-
ent agencies.  § 1700.4(a).  Section 1700.44(a) stated that “[i]n cases of controversy arising under
this chapter, the parties involved shall refer the matters in dispute to the Labor Commissioner,
who shall hear and determine the same, subject to an appeal within 10 days after determination,
to the superior court where the same shall be heard de novo.”
146. Preston, 552 U.S. at 350.
147. Ferrer, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 630.
148. Id.
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California courts have historically been particularly hostile to arbi-
tration.150  However, California is not the only state to limit the en-
forceability of arbitration provisions.  The Supreme Court struck
down a Florida law similar to the TAA in the 2006 case Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna.151  The Court relied heavily on the
opinion in Buckeye to reach its ruling in Preston.
In Preston, the Court held by a vote of eight to one that whenever
parties agree to arbitrate a dispute arising under a contract, state laws
that purport to give state courts or administrative forums primary ju-
risdiction to hear the dispute are superseded by the FAA and the dis-
pute must be arbitrated.152  Accordingly, the Court ruled that the
FAA supersedes a California law requiring submission of disputes in-
volving talent agents to the California Labor Commissioner.153  This
decision validates the FAA’s national policy favoring arbitration, de-
spite state efforts to limit or undermine it.  This ruling is also quite
employer friendly—under the Court’s logic, even in the face of clear
state legislation that disfavors arbitration as a policy matter, ERISA
arbitration under the FAA could proceed.
The Supreme Court found Preston to essentially be controlled by its
prior decision in Buckeye.154  This ruling bolstered the decision in Gil-
mer, precluding state legislators from curtailing the enforceability of
arbitration clauses.  By making it clear that the FAA preempts state
law, even in cases where a state legislature has made its policy direc-
tives clear through the enactment of legislation and creation of state
agencies,155 the Supreme Court made jumping the arbitration hurdle
all the more difficult.  This is especially relevant in the context of ER-
ISA, which has been consistently interpreted to preempt state law by
courts, which means that ERISA agreements will be seen as overrid-
ing any applicable state law, weakening the policy arguments disfavor-
ing arbitration.156
149. Id. at 634.
150. FISHER & PHILLIPS, supra note 35.
151. 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (holding that challenges to the validity of a contract requiring arbi-
tration of disputes should ordinarily be considered by an arbitrator and not a court).
152. Preston, 552 U.S. at 349–50.
153. Id. at 359.
154. Id. at 349–52.
155. “When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analy-
sis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”  AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011).
156. Ytterberg, supra note 34.
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iii. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
The Court took its pro-arbitration position a bit further in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.157  In 2002, Vincent and Liza Concep-
cion responded to an advertisement for a “free” AT&T cellphone
with the purchase of a two-year service contract.158  After learning
they had to pay $30.22 in sales tax for the putatively free device, the
Concepcions initiated a class action lawsuit.159  AT&T then moved to
compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause, which contained
a class action waiver, in its standard service agreement.160  The clause
further provided that AT&T would pay claimants a minimum of
$7,500 and twice their attorney’s fees if they obtained an arbitration
award in excess of AT&T’s final settlement offer.161
Prior to Concepcion, the California Supreme Court had held that
class action waivers that appeared in contracts of adhesion were un-
conscionable and against public policy.162  The Concepcions argued
that this rule—the Discover Bank rule—should apply.163  Under the
Discover Bank rule, California courts could refuse to enforce any con-
tract found “to have been unconscionable at the time it was made.”164
The courts could also “limit the application of any unconscionable
clause.”165  In the context of class action waivers in arbitration agree-
ments, the Discover Bank rule stated that
when the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a
setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predict-
ably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that
the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of in-
dividually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in
practice the exemption of the party “from responsibility for [its]
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.”
157. 131 S. Ct. 1740.
158. Id. at 1744.  AT&T’s contract provided, “THIS AGREEMENT REQUIRES THE USE
OF ARBITRATION ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES, RATHER
THAN JURY TRIALS OR CLASS ACTIONS, AND ALSO LIMITS THE REMEDIES
AVAILABLE TO YOU IN THE EVENT OF A DISPUTE.” Charles Gibbs, Note, Consumer
Class Actions After AT&T v. Concepcion: Why the Federal Arbitration Act Should Not Be Used
To Deny Effective Relief to Small-Value Claims, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1345, 1362–63.
159. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
160. Id. at 1744–45.
161. Id. at 1745.
162. Discover Bank v. Sup. Ct. of L.A., 113 P. 3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005).
163. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
164. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1670.5(a) (West 1985).
165. Id.
2015] ERISA AND ARBITRATION 791
Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under
California law and should not be enforced.166
The district court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Dis-
cover Bank rule, finding the contract entered into by the Concepcions
a contract of adhesion and refusing to compel arbitration.167
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed,
compelling arbitration.168  The Court began by making reference to a
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.”169  Then, first noting that
the FAA always preempts state law, the Court conducted the “more
complex” inquiry as to whether a generally applicable doctrine—here,
unconscionability—was applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitra-
tion.170  The Court stated that it was improper for state courts to rely
on the “uniqueness” of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis to refuse
to compel arbitration on the grounds of unconscionability.171  Under
this rationale, the Court overturned Discover Bank on the ground that
Discover Bank categorically allowed claimants in any consumer case
to demand classwide arbitration ex post.172
Concepcion vastly expanded the ability of employers to rely on the
FAA and destroyed states’ ability to legislate around the FAA by
holding that “the FAA does indeed preempt state law.”173  It also ex-
panded the application of the Preston doctrine to class action suits,
limiting access to litigation for a broader scope of claims and
plaintiffs.174
166. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668).
167. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
168. Id. at 1744, 1756.
169. Id. at 1745 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983)).
170. Id. at 1747.
171. Id. (“[A] court may not ‘rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for
a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court
to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.’” (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9
(1987)).
172. Id. at 1750.
California’s Discover Bank rule . . . interferes with arbitration.  Although the rule does
not require classwide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to demand
it ex post.  The rule is limited to adhesion contracts, but the times in which consumer
contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.
Id. (citation omitted).
173. Roger Pilon, Into the Preemption Thicket Again—Five Times!, 2011 CATO SUPREME CT.
REV. 263, 269.
174. Heather N. Retchless, Alternative Dispute Resolution—Has the Supreme Court Signifi-
cantly Expanded the Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements and Class-Action Waivers?—
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), 35 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 227,
227–28 (2011).
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iv. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,175 the Court
marched ahead in its pro-arbitration,176 pro-employer stance, ruling
against rationales that center on protecting consumers with little bar-
gaining power who enter into contracts of adhesion.  A number of
merchants sued American Express Co. (AMEX), alleging that the
Card Acceptance Agreements (Card Agreements)—standard form
contracts outlining the basic relationship between AMEX and the
merchant—violated United States antitrust laws.177  The Card Agree-
ments included a class action waiver provision contained in a
mandatory arbitration clause.178  The merchants sued as a class be-
cause the individual damages would be less than the independent cost
to litigate.179  The Second Circuit held that the arbitration clause, in
particular the class action waiver, was unenforceable because it would
essentially protect AMEX from antitrust suits.180  AMEX appealed to
the Supreme Court.181
The Supreme Court held that even when suits against corporations
(especially for antitrust violations) would be too expensive for individ-
uals to bring, class action suits are barred when the consumers have
explicitly waived them, even when disproportionate bargaining power
existed at the time of formation.182  This is where the case law ends,
and speculation, analysis, and argument begin.
In Italian Colors, the Court relied heavily on its decision in Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,183 holding that a
party cannot be compelled to submit to classwide arbitration absent
an agreement to do so.184  In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court ruled that impos-
ing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are silent on
that issue is inconsistent with the FAA.185  However, a later case es-
175. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
176. Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center,
Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 325 (2011).
177. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308.
178. Id.
179. Id.  “In resisting the motion, respondents submitted a declaration from an economist who
estimated that the cost of an expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims would be ‘at
least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,’ while the maximum recov-
ery for an individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled.” Id.
180. Id.
181. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (granting certiorari).
182. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11.
183. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
184. Id. at 687.
185. Id. The Stolt-Nielsen decision came after another case that permitted arbitrators to de-
cide whether a contract allows class proceedings in arbitration if the contract is silent on the
issue.  Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion).
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tablished that a contract with an arbitration agreement that is silent on
the issue of class action cases can be interpreted to include a class
action arbitration clause.186  After Stolt-Nielsen and Bazzle, practition-
ers began including explicit class action waivers in their arbitration
agreements, fearing uncertainty.187  The Court’s decision in Italian
Colors guarantees that those class action waivers will be upheld.
III. ANALYSIS
Both courts and legal commentators have noted that ERISA claims
are well suited for arbitration because they are confined to a discrete
statutory scheme and often include contracts, which demonstrate the
parties’ intent to arbitrate.188  However, just because something is
easy, does not mean it is the best option.  This section of the Comment
analyzes how the use of class action arbitration waiver clauses in ER-
ISA agreements could have potential legal pitfalls, limiting their suc-
cess.  First, an analogy between the bodies of law governing ERISA
plans and the laws of trusts is appropriate because both bodies of law
impose a fiduciary duty created by a legal instrument.  In fact, “the
common law of trusts served as the basis for ERISA’s fiduciary duty
provisions, and courts have often applied the common law of trusts in
interpreting ERISA’s fiduciary rules.”189  Courts have been hesitant
to allow arbitration clauses in trust instruments for many of the same
rationales against allowing arbitration clauses in ERISA agree-
ments.190  Second, the argument can be made that ERISA plans pre-
186. Id.
187. Cook & Brennan, supra note 41, at 333.  In the wake of these decisions, which corporate-
side labor attorneys have described as “positive development[s] for employers,” practitioners
have advocated for the inclusion of arbitration agreements in ERISA agreements. FISHER &
PHILLIPS, supra note 35.
188. See supra notes 24–187 and accompanying text.  For examples of other instances when
the Court has enforced arbitration in statutory claims connected to contract, see Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that an antitrust dis-
pute was subject to arbitration under the FAA, and that there is no presumption against the
arbitration of statutory claims); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(holding that an age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was
subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registra-
tion application).
189. Michael J. Collins, It’s Common, but Is It Right?  The Common Law of Trusts in ERISA
Fiduciary Litigation, 16 LAB. LAW. 391 (2001).
190. See, e.g., Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 612–14 (Ct. App. 2011) (refusing to en-
force an arbitration agreement in trust formation documents at the request of the trustee, who
the beneficiary of the trust petitioned to remove, because neither was party to any agreement
that such disputes would be resolved by arbitration), vacated, 287 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2012);
Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1082–84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that trusts are
contracts because they do not rest on an exchange of promises or any other characteristics of
contract law, and that an arbitration agreement included in the trust formation documents was
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sent issues of privity between parties because they are so frequently
entered into on the behalf of plan beneficiaries by investment manag-
ers.  Third, from a policy perspective, the proliferation of arbitration
clauses in ERISA agreements will create long-term tension between
plan providers and beneficiaries, making employer-provided retire-
ment plans less appealing than alternative options available on the
open market.
A. The Trust Analogy
ERISA plans and traditional trusts have many similarities.191  A
traditional trust is a legal entity established to hold and manage assets
for a purpose.192  There are three main parties to the trust: (1) the
settlor who sets up and transfers property to the trust; (2) the trustee
who manages the trust’s assets and holds legal title to the trust; and
(3) the beneficiary who ultimately benefits from the assets in which
she has an equitable interest.193  ERISA plans are usually comprised
of three fiduciaries: (1) a trustee;194 (2) an investment manager; and
(3) a plan administrator.195  The responsibilities of the fiduciaries are
largely identical to the responsibilities of a normal trustee.  The fiduci-
ary must (1) act solely in the interest of the plan beneficiaries; (2)
carry out her duties with skill, prudence, and diligence; (3) follow the
plan documents (similar to carrying out the will of the settlor of a
trust); (4) diversify plan investments; (5) pay only reasonable expenses
in administering the plan and investing the plan assets; and (6) avoid
conflicts of interest.196  These responsibilities are highly analogous to
not enforceable), superseded by statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2012); Williams v.
Orentlicher, 939 N.E.2d 663, 670–72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the Indiana State
Teacher’s Association (ISTA) trust was not bound by arbitration clauses in employment con-
tracts between ISTA and former employees because (1) the employment agreements at issue did
not mention the trust; (2) ISTA was not a named party in the lawsuit; and (3) the trust was
nonsignatory).
191. Collins, supra note 189, at 395–97.
192. Owen G. Fiore et al., A.L.I.-A.B.A., Probate Avoidance and Other Uses of Trusts, in
ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE FAMILY BUSINESS OWNER 469, 473 (1992), reprinted at C771 ALI-
ABA 469.
193. Id.
194. The trustee is a fiduciary who is in charge of the day-to-day administration of the trust,
and usually has “exclusive authority and discretion over the management and control of plan
assets,” unless the plan documents delegate control over certain decisions (such as investment
decisions) to another party, such as an investment manager. Responsibilities of Retirement Plan
Trustees—and What To Do About It, BENEFITS L. GRP. CHI., http://www.benefitslawgroupofchi
cago.com/HTML/Responsibilities-of-Retirement-Plan-Trustees.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
195. FAQs About Retirement Plans and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/
ebsa/faqs/faq_consumer_pension.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2013) [hereinafter FAQs About Re-
tirement Plans].
196. Id.
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those of a trust, which include the duty of loyalty, the duty of pru-
dence, the duty to diversify, and the duty to account.197  Accordingly,
the impact of arbitration on the fiduciary relationship between ER-
ISA plan providers and beneficiaries is similar to its impact on the
fiduciary relationship between trustees and beneficiaries.  Because of
the similar nature of the heightened responsibilities of fiduciaries in
both trusts and retirement plans, arbitration should be disfavored in
order to maintain the availability of litigation to injured plan
beneficiaries.
The classic example of a trust’s use of arbitration clauses goes as
follows: a settlor, wanting to avoid the expense and publicity of fiduci-
ary litigation, directs in the trust instrument that all disputes between
a beneficiary and the trustee must be resolved by arbitration.198
Courts are split as to whether or not these arbitration clauses are en-
forceable.199  The Uniform Trust Code (UTC) does not provide a suc-
cinct answer.  The only reference to arbitration can be found in a
comment on trustees’ powers, stating that “[s]ettlors wishing to en-
courage use of alternate dispute resolution may draft to provide it.”200
This statement does not make clear whether a mandatory arbitration
clause is enforceable—instead, the drafters of the UTC appear to sim-
ply encourage arbitration.201
The use of arbitration clauses in trust instruments has faced signifi-
cant pushback from state courts.202  For example, in Schoneberger v.
197. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
579–685 (9th ed. 2013).  The duty of loyalty requires the trustee to act in the best interest of the
trust beneficiary and avoid conflicts of interest. Id. at 586.  The duty of prudence requires the
trustee to consider the purpose, terms, and requirements of a trust, and administer the trust as a
prudent person would. Id. at 602.  The duty to diversify, a subset of the duty of prudence, re-
quires the trustee to make diverse investments to safeguard the trust assets and investments. Id.
at 622–34.  The duty to account requires the trustee to provide statements of accounting to trust
beneficiaries so that they can stay informed of the health and growth of their assets. Id. at
667–68.
198. For an example, see AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WILLS AND TRUSTS: ARBITRATION RULES
& MEDIATION PROCEDURES 17 (2012), available at http://www.adr.org/.
199. See generally David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments,
90 N.C. L. REV. 1027 (2012); Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: Defining the
Parameters for Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 118 (2011);
Stephen Wills Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A Critique, 26 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627 (2011); S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes:  Two Bodies of Law
Collide, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1157 (2012); S.I. Strong, Empowering Settlors: How Proper
Language Can Increase the Enforceability of a Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a Trust, 47
REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 275 (2012).
200. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 816 (amended 2010).
201. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 197, at 614.
202. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 190.
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Oelze,203 the court refused to enforce a mandatory arbitration provi-
sion included in a trust instrument.204  The court asserted that a settlor
“may not unilaterally strip trust beneficiaries of their right to access
the courts absent their agreement.”205  In other words, because the
beneficiaries never agreed to the arbitration clause at issue, they can-
not be bound to arbitrate.206  However, this argument might fail be-
cause “a beneficiary’s interest is derivative of the settlor’s freedom of
disposition”—the gift from the settlor to the beneficiary is conditional
on the beneficiary accepting the conditions imposed by the settlor.207
Thus, the question becomes “whether requiring fiduciary disputes to
be resolved by arbitration is within the settlor’s freedom of
disposition.”208
Following Schoneberger, legislatures in Florida209 and Arizona210
enacted statutes permitting settlors to include arbitration clauses “to
resolve issues between the trustee and [a beneficiary] with regard to
the administration or distribution of the trust.”211  These statutes (as
well as recent cases upholding arbitration provisions) mandate that if
a beneficiary brings a claim to enforce her interest as defined by the
trust instrument, any arbitration clause contained in the instrument
will be enforceable against the beneficiary.  Courts have reasoned
“that [a beneficiary’s] claim was to enforce [her] interests as defined
by the settlor in the terms of the trust, including the arbitration
clause.”212  A compelling counterargument is that fiduciary enforce-
ment in court should be part of the mandatory core of trust fiduciary
law, as asserted in Schoneberger.213  This argument is based on the
premise that trust instruments cannot include exculpatory clauses as
to bad faith or willful neglect in the trust, because accountability is
essential to the nature of the trust relationship.214
Arguably, this “accountability” should be extended to “accountabil-
ity in court,” before a judge.215  If there is a shred of doubt regarding
203. 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), superseded by statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
10205 (2012).
204. Id. at 1082–84.
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 197, at 614.
208. Id.
209. FLA. STAT. § 731.401 (2012).
210. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2012).
211. Id.
212. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 197, at 614.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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whether or not equal treatment can be obtained at arbitration as op-
posed to court,216 the court should err on the side of restricting en-
forcement of arbitration clauses.  Limiting the access of
beneficiaries—who may not have been involved in the formation of
the trust—to confront negligent or errant trustees in court curtails the
accountability of the trustee, which is necessary to give fiduciary du-
ties teeth.  Such a limitation comes very close to restricting the right of
an aggrieved party to their day in court, which raises significant consti-
tutional problems.217  For that reason, it makes sense that a court
should err on the side of allowing beneficiaries access to courts, even
when the settlor of a trust has contracted around it with an arbitration
clause, as beneficiaries are independent from the formation of the
trust.  This, of course, is a balance between the freedom of disposition
in trust (that is, the ability of the settlor to set up the trust as she
pleases) and the duty of accountability of the trustee.  Ultimately, the
beneficiary’s right to hold the trustee accountable is paramount—the
trust exists for the benefit of the beneficiary.  Additionally, because
the fiduciary duty is the centerpiece of the modern trust,218 the right
of accountability seems to be the most important factor at issue.
Similarly, because of the fiduciary responsibilities created by ER-
ISA, accountability in court is an essential part of ERISA, suggesting
that arbitration clauses should not be used in the ERISA context.
Where the fiduciary duties are similar between two bodies of law, it
makes sense that the access to the judicial systems provided by both
bodies should be analogous.  The fact that the legislature of Arizona
legislated around the court’s construction of trusts as not being arbi-
trable219 is dispositive here.  In Arizona, the legislature needed to step
in and assert “special action” jurisdiction to enforce arbitration
clauses in trust documents after the courts refused to do so.220  This
216. One legal scholar has suggested that there is a lot of doubt on this issue, warranting a
public rating system for arbitration providers. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitra-
tion Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System To Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer
and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985
(2012).
217. See generally Stephen Wills Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts:
A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 643–44 (2011).
218. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trust, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 628
(1995) (“[T]he law of fiduciary administration . . . is the centerpiece of the modern trust.”).
219. Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), in which the court refused to
enforce an arbitration clause in trust documents, was overruled by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
10205 (2015) (“A trust instrument may provide mandatory, exclusive[,] and reasonable proce-
dures to resolve issues between the trustee and interested persons or among interested persons
with regard to the administration or distribution of a trust.”).
220. Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1079; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2015); see also Jones
v. Fink, No. 1 CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011).
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fact is especially relevant to ERISA, which is a federal law.  Arguably,
because ERISA’s preemptive power is so strong, it would take much
more than a state law—like the one enacted in Arizona221—to permit
the enforcement of arbitration clauses.  ERISA simply would not be
subject to state law in that way—it is a federal statute.  This concern is
multiplied on a class action scale, as more and more employee benefi-
ciaries would lose their ability to hold plan fiduciaries accountable in
court.
The argument for including accountability in court in the doctrinal
core of ERISA is stronger than it is in trust cases.222  In trust cases, the
beneficiaries are selected by the settlor, who “gives” the principal of
the trust to a trustee, who takes on a set of fiduciary responsibilities
and must follow the wishes of a settlor.223  In this case, the settlor
selects the beneficiary—the beneficiary does not select the settlor.224
In the case of ERISA, the beneficiary of the trust contracts either di-
rectly with the plan provider or through one of the provider’s agents
(the trustee, financial advisor, or plan administrator).225  In that re-
gard, the “giving” inherent in a trust is relatively one-sided—the bene-
ficiary does not typically have a role in negotiating or discussing the
contents of the trust with the settlor.  This is in stark contrast with the
workplace ERISA context, where the connection between the benefi-
ciaries and the employer plan provider is direct and two-sided, with
communication between the parties often occurring through a com-
pany’s employee benefits or human resources department, making the
need for accountability more salient.  Furthermore, the argument
presented above—that the beneficiary is unfairly subject to the will of
the settlor—is moot, as there is no settlor in the ERISA context.  The
plan beneficiary and the plan provider enter the agreement them-
selves.  This argument might be countered by the fact that pension
plans are usually non-negotiable and that the plan provider usually
dictates the terms of the package to the employee, who can opt in or
out of an employer-provided retirement plan.226  Thus, one could
221. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205.
222. FAQs About Retirement Plans, supra note 195.
223. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 197, at 579–80, 614.
224. Id. at 614.
225. According to the Department of Labor, the purpose of ERISA is to “protect[ ] the assets
of millions of Americans so that funds placed in retirement plans during their working lives will
be there when they retire.” FAQs About Retirement Plans, supra note 195.  Holding those in
charge of carrying out this goal accountable when they violate the law is, arguably, necessary to
give the law teeth.
226. EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT 401(K)
PLANS FOR SMALL BUSINESS, IRS PUBL’N NO. 4674 (2013) [hereinafter AUTOMATIC ENROLL-
MENT 401(K) PLANS], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4674.pdf.
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make an analogy between the settlor to the plan administrator/pro-
vider.  However, this argument holds less water because some plan
providers will negotiate their packages, especially when it comes to
the hiring context.227  This ability to negotiate is amplified with collec-
tive bargaining entities, as they are likely to have even more power
when it comes to negotiating retirement plans.228
While there is some question regarding the degree to which judges
are permitted to find arbitration clauses unconscionable following
Concepcion and Italian Colors,229 there is very little movement in the
courts regarding whether trust documents can be subject to arbitration
clauses.  Accordingly, the argument can be made that the arena of
trust law has been less impacted by the increase in the adoption of
arbitration clauses by sophisticated contract drafters than other areas
of the law (specifically, antitrust law).  The similarity between trusts
and ERISA pension plans should give courts pause when applying the
broad enforcement of arbitration clauses endorsed by the Supreme
Court.
B. The Privity Problem
Privity of contract presents another argument against enforcing ar-
bitration agreements in pension plans.  Arbitration clauses in ERISA
agreements should not be enforced because pension plan agreements
between plan providers and beneficiaries are often subject to interme-
diary agreements between investment managers and plan providers.
A prime example of this kind of arrangement is seen in Comer, where
an ERISA beneficiary was enrolled in an employer pension plan that
was not sufficiently diversified.230  The pension plan hired an invest-
ment management company, governed by “investment management
agreements.”231  Accordingly, the plan beneficiary never signed any of
the agreements between the investment manager and the employer
plan provider.232  Because of this dynamic, the court found that there
227. Negotiate a Smarter Retirement Package, MERRILL LYNCH, http://insights.wm.ml.com/re
tirement/negotiate-a-smarter-retirement-package.html#fbid=jFIW_FB8yTV (last visited Nov.
12, 2013).
228. See Robert A. Blum, Opportunities To Save Pension Costs Through Collective Bargain-
ing After Pension Reform, W. CITY, Apr. 2013, at 9, available at http://www.westerncity.com/
Western-City/April-2013/Opportunities-to-Save-Pension-Costs/.
229. See generally David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State
Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217 (2013).
230. Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1099–1100.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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was no privity of contract between the plan provider, the investment
manager, and the plan beneficiary.233
As discussed above,234 it is common for plan administrators to hire
investment managers to ensure that pension plans are being invested
wisely.235  It is very unlikely that plan beneficiaries have signed the
investment management agreements.236  This is not surprising, espe-
cially given the size of many corporations that offer pension plans.237
For example, it would be nothing short of unwieldy for a corporation
like Walmart to have every single plan beneficiary (which is likely to
be high, as Walmart currently has around 2,000,000 employees)238 sign
an agreement every time Walmart changes investment managers.
The court in Comer stated that “nonsignatories of arbitration agree-
ments may be bound by the agreement under ordinary contract and
agency principles.”239  These principles include incorporation by refer-
ence and estoppel.240  Additionally, nonsignatories can enforce arbi-
tration agreements as third-party beneficiaries.241  To that end, the
argument can be made that if the investment manager/pension plan
agreement is entered into first, it can be attached to the plan provider/
plan beneficiary agreements and incorporated by reference.  How-
ever, an issue arises when a plan provider decides to make changes to
233. Id. at 1103–04.
234. See supra notes 18–19, 28–31 and accompanying text.
235. FISHER & PHILLIPS, supra note 35.
236. There are many government resources that outline who are considered plan fiduciaries
and what their responsibilities are in retirement plans. See, e.g., What You Should Know About
Your Retirement Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/wys-
kapr.html (last visited July 29, 2014) [hereinafter What You Should Know].
237. While there are some sources that suggest the number of employer-sponsored 401(k) and
defined benefit plans are decreasing, more than half of U.S. companies offer 401(k) plans for
their workers.  Brian O’Connell, More U.S. Firms Shutter 401(k)s, Matching Programs, THES-
TREET (May 2, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/11911313/1/more-us-firms-shut
ter-401ks-matching-programs.html.
238. Wal-Mart Company Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN, http://www.statisticbrain.com/wal-mart-
company-statistics/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
239. Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Letizia v. Prudential
Bache Sec., Inc., 802 F.2d 1185, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Id. Under the doctrine of incorporation by reference, a nonsignatory may compel arbi-
tration against a party to an arbitration agreement when that party has entered into a separate
contractual relationship with the nonsignatory which incorporates the existing arbitration clause.
Imp. Exp. Steel Corp. v. Miss. Valley Barge Line Co., 351 F.2d 503, 505–06 (2d Cir. 1965).
Under the doctrine of estoppel, a party who knowingly exploits an agreement without signing
the agreement can be estopped from avoiding arbitration when the unsigned agreement con-
tained an arbitration clause.  Deloitte Noraudit A/S v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, U.S., 9 F.3d
1060, 1064 (2d Cir. 1993).
241. See Deloitte Noraudit, 9 F.3d at 1064.
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its plan or to whom it uses as an investment manager.242  This is be-
cause it would be incredibly expensive from both a time and money
standpoint to recontract and reincorporate every time any of the par-
ties to either of the agreements change.243  As such, incorporation by
reference is likely to be difficult to execute in practice.
Additionally, a party might raise estoppel as one argument for get-
ting around the problem of privity to enforce arbitration clauses in
ERISA agreements.  Under this principle, a litigant would be es-
topped from asserting a privity defense to an ERISA agreement when
she “knowingly exploits the agreement containing the arbitration
clause despite having never signed the agreement.”244  However, this
argument does not have much force.  It is unlikely that a court will
find that by simply participating in pension plans managed for benefi-
ciaries, a litigant has “exploited the agreement.”  Arguably, the bene-
ficiary was only exploiting the contract which she was privy to—the
agreement between her and the pension plan provider.  Accordingly,
arbitration clauses are unlikely to be enforced under estoppel princi-
ples in the ERISA context.
Lastly, the Third245 and Ninth246 Circuits have held that only the
intended beneficiary of a pension plan has standing to sue under the
plan.  In order “[t]o sue as a third-party beneficiary of a contract, the
third party must show that the contract reflects the express or implied
intention of the parties to the contract to benefit the third party.”247
In line with this argument, the party seeking to enforce the arbitration
agreement would need to prove that the signatories to the agreement
that was not signed by the party was intended to benefit the party,
thereby granting it a right to sue under the agreement.248
The Third Circuit held in DuPont that “whether seeking to avoid or
compel arbitration, a third party beneficiary has been bound by con-
242. In fact, changes to the plan must be made known to the beneficiary on a periodic basis.
See, e.g., What You Should Know, supra note 236.  This means that an update mailing might
contain a voluminous description of changes, ranging from major changes to very small changes,
which can go unnoticed by plan beneficiaries.
243. Not to mention that this would go above and beyond what is required by law. Id.
244. Comer, 436 F.3d at 1101 (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc
Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 199 (3d Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
245. Dupont, 269 F.3d 187.  This is discussed in greater detail at infra notes 249–252 and ac-
companying text.
246. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that third-party beneficiaries suing for enforcement of a contract to which they were not
parties did not have standing because there was no intention on the part of the signers of the
contract to grant the third-party beneficiaries enforceable rights).
247. Id. at 1211.
248. Id.
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tract terms where its claim arises out of the underlying contract to
which it was an intended third party beneficiary.”249  However, this
position is unusual and also faces a less straightforward version of the
intention argument above—was the third-party beneficiary intended
to arise out of the underlying contract?  If not, is she estopped from
arguing against enforcement of the arbitration clause if she received
benefits under the contract? If these questions are answered in the
negative, the question then becomes whether or not a trustee (the
plan provider) acts as the beneficiary’s agent in entering into invest-
ment management agreements.250  An argument that the trust acts as
the beneficiary’s agent is also likely to fail, as agents and trusts are not
interchangeable.251  So, in order to succeed in a DuPont analysis, the
third-party beneficiary would need to demonstrate that a principle of
contract or agency law present in the original contract (such as estop-
pel, incorporation by reference, etc.) led to the suit.  This analysis re-
peats earlier arguments for getting around the privity requirement,
and like those arguments, does not hold much water.252
The lack of privity between plan beneficiaries and investment man-
ager/pension provider agreements is likely the strongest legal argu-
ment against the enforcement of arbitration provisions in these
agreements.  In order for these agreements to be enforceable as to
third-party beneficiaries, drafters will need to find a way to incorpo-
rate by reference subsequent agreements.  In the alternative, invest-
ment manager/pension provider agreements will need to “invite”
beneficiaries to the contract, opening the possibility of lawsuits that
may have been previously untenable due to privity concerns.  This
analysis shows that the privity sword cuts both ways—it might limit
the ability to sue under the contract, but it also limits the enforceabil-
ity of clauses that might be beneficial to the liable party (specifically,
arbitration clauses).
C. Policy Considerations
In addition to the various legal arguments against the enforcement
of arbitration clauses, there are also a number of policy considerations
that suggest that the wide adoption of arbitration clauses in ERISA
agreements might do more harm than good.  While many of these
249. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 195.
250. For example, “when one corporation acts as the agent of a disclosed principal corpora-
tion, the latter corporation may be liable on contracts made by the agency.  Liability may attach
to the principal corporation even though it is not a party name in the agreement.” Id. at 198.
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 8 (1959).
252. See supra notes 230–244 and accompanying text.
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concerns have been leveled in antitrust suits where defendants have
been able to successfully compel arbitration, the ERISA context pro-
vides a stronger case for policy considerations against arbitration due
to its underlying fiduciary elements.
As a preliminary matter, antitrust suits arising from contracts with
arbitration clauses are distinguishable from ERISA agreements for a
number of reasons.  The number of individuals who are impacted by
ERISA is high.253  While one might argue that the number of individ-
uals impacted by ERISA cannot be larger than the number of people
who use credit cards or cell phones, the important distinguishing fac-
tor here is that not everyone needs to use credit cards or cell phones.
These items are discretionary, and require a discrete action by the
consumer (namely, seeking out and purchasing the good while simul-
taneously entering into a service contract).  This is unlike pension
plans, which are often presented as a term of employment, and are a
vital source of financial support for many who save for retirement.254
Similarly, an ERISA plan beneficiary need not seek out the services
of a pension plan—it is offered by her employer and is often part of
employment packages.255  For those reasons, strict enforcement of ar-
bitration clauses in the antitrust context should not be strictly applied
to ERISA agreements.
While the negative effects of the enforcement of arbitration clauses
have traditionally been thought to affect consumer plaintiffs more
than corporate defendants,256 pension plan providers might also be
disadvantaged by the enforcement of arbitration clauses in the ERISA
context.  Without protective plan language (that is, language in the
agreements themselves, taking privity concerns into consideration),
“arbitration becomes a crapshoot.”257  “Once an unfavorable arbitra-
253. O’Connell, supra note 237.
254. See AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT 401(K) PLANS, supra note 226.
255. See O’Connell, supra note 237.
256. See generally Tanya M. Marcum & Elizabeth A. Campbell, The Arbitration Seesaw: Fed-
eral Act Preempts General Law Thereby Restricting Judicial Review, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 965
(2013).  This much is clear, because
[s]mall recoveries do not encourage an individual to bring a sole action, and, as a result,
putative defendants can engage in low stakes frauds and law violations with impunity
and, if the number of occurrences is large enough, quite profitably.  Not surprisingly, it
has been an open secret for over a decade that a major motivation—perhaps the domi-
nant motivation—for the imposition of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts has
been the hope that these clauses would blossom into class action waivers.
Id. at 970–71 (quoting David Schwartz, Do-It-Yourself Tort Reform: How the Supreme Court
Quietly Killed the Class Action, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 16, 2011, 10:52 AM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/do-it-yourself-tort-reform-how-the-supreme-court-quietly-killed-
the-class-action/ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
257. Baker, supra note 71, at 91–92.
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tor’s decision has been made, the courts almost always enforce the
arbitration award.”258  Furthermore, “these arbitration awards are
rarely overturned, even if the arbitrator makes an obvious mis-
take.”259  This is because the court can only overturn an arbitrator’s
finding if there is an obvious, capricious, or arbitrary award—an in-
credibly high bar for a court to clear.260  Consequently, by participat-
ing in arbitration, an issue that might not have been the central issue
in the initial suit might be decided and later precluded on res judicata
principles.  For example, imagine a situation where B and C sue A for
negligence.  A and B decide to resolve their dispute in arbitration in-
stead of in litigation.  The arbitrator finds that A created a dangerous
condition and had a duty to B and C, but finds that the dangerous
condition did not cause B’s injuries.  C, relying on that information,
sues A.  A is limited by the doctrine of res judicata and can no longer
argue that she did not create a dangerous condition.  Because of the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review, it would be incredibly dif-
ficult for A to overturn the findings made at arbitration.  A is now
stuck with those stipulations.
Arbitrators are not bound by case law, so facing an arbitrator can
be much riskier than facing a judge bound by precedent.261  Arguably,
this makes it more difficult to research and prepare for cases when
they are to go in front of an arbitrator.  Additionally, because arbitra-
tors overwhelmingly rely on their own sense of justice and fairness,
“enjoy[ing] a certain freedom in the exercise of their duties,”262 arbi-
trators are potentially more likely to exhibit their biases, which may
negatively impact an employer’s case.
Arguably, employees are also harmed by the enforcement of arbi-
tration clauses in the ERISA context.  Specifically, by enforcing arbi-
tration clauses in ERISA agreements, the employee is unable to
immediately pursue a violation of ERISA in court.263  This harm is
especially troubling because pension plans are often seen as “standard
contracts”264—employees can take them or leave them.265  While
258. Id. at 92.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See generally Weidemaier, supra note 73.
262. Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 5 (2011).
263. See supra notes 188–252.
264. See, e.g., Dugan v. R.J. Corman R.R. Co., 344 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2003) (characterizing an
ERISA agreement as “boilerplate,” “form,” “standard,” and a “contract of adhesion”).
265. For an example of one of these standard pension contracts, see I.A.M. NAT’L PENSION
FUND, STANDARD CONTRACT LANGUAGE, http://mypension.iamnpf.org/media/21103/standard_
contract_language.pdf (updated Nov. 2006).
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some pension providers permit negotiations between plan providers
and beneficiaries, many beneficiaries are not aware that they can bar-
gain for different terms in their 401(k) agreements or simply do not
think about retirement benefits at the time they are hired.266  Stan-
dard form contracts raise red flags, although courts have upheld them
consistently.267  However, given the sheer number of people who en-
roll in employer-backed pension plans, courts should carefully con-
sider the bargaining disparity of the parties.  This argument is
bolstered by the fact that what is at stake for the plan beneficiary is
significant—for most people, their livelihood at old age is dependent
on their pension plans.268  The financial security of a pension plan is
paramount to an elderly person’s ability to take care of her financial
needs.269  The same cannot be said for more traditional examples of
standard form contracts, such as software service agreements270 or
cellphone contracts.271
Arbitration clauses are also likely to deter potential ERISA plan
beneficiaries from investing in employer-backed pension plans.  This
argument proceeds as follows: imagine a plan beneficiary checks up
on her 401(k), only to realize that the plan has lost a significant
amount of money due to the investor’s negligent investing and lack of
diversification.  She attempts to sue her employer for the diminution
in value of her pension, only to have her case thrown out after the
employer compels arbitration.  The employee has no recollection of
ever signing any arbitration agreement.  What will result?  It seems
reasonable that the employee would pull all of her money out of her
401(k) plan.  She might warn others at her company that if anything
were to happen to their pension funds, they would not be able to seek
damages at court and would instead be forced into arbitration.  Over-
all, this kind of emotionally charged reaction to being “trapped” by a
contract a plan beneficiary did not bargain for could deter employees
from signing up for employer-sponsored retirement benefit plans in
the future.  Arguably, pulling investment capital from 401(k) funds
and other employer-sponsored retirement funds would have a nega-
266. Negotiate a Smarter Retirement Package, supra note 227.
267. See, e.g., Dugan, 344 F.3d at 662; Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372 (7th Cir.
1990); Commc’ns Maint., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 761 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1985); Vitex Mfg. Corp.
v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967). See generally Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering
Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123 (2005).
268. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TAKING THE MYSTERY OUT OF RETIREMENT PLANNING  (2012),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/nearretirement.pdf.
269. Id.
270. Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Const. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (2006).
271. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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tive effect on the overall economic welfare of the American invest-
ment market.272  Consumers switching from employer-sponsored
retirement funds to individual ROTH IRA accounts273 and, arguably,
index fund investment accounts might mitigate this effect, as the funds
would still be used as investment capital, as opposed to being stored
by the consumer herself or in a bank.  However, these investment ac-
counts do not include the advantageous employer-matching provi-
sions,274 which are valuable to beneficiaries investing in the plans.
Lastly, there is a significant risk of bias and impartiality when cor-
porations engage in arbitration.275  This issue is not unique to ER-
ISA—it was discussed at length in the context of employment
discrimination cases in the popular film Hot Coffee.276  However, the
argument also applies to the fiduciary breach claims based on ERISA
agreements.  Traditionally, the party that requests arbitration (in this
case, the plan provider) chooses which arbitrator to use.277  Addition-
ally, corporations (and their legal counsel) are more likely to be aware
of possible arbitrators or arbitration services.278  Arguably, these fac-
272. As of June 2014, 401(k) plans held an estimated $4.4 trillion in assets, representing nearly
18% of the $24.0 trillion in U.S. retirement assets. Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k)
Plans, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST., http://www.ici.org/policy/retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k
(last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
273. In June 2012, IRAs constituted 26.5% of all retirement holdings, and there were nearly
15 million IRA accounts held by more than 11 million people with total assets of more than $1
trillion.  Karen DeMasters, How Much Do People Really Have in IRAs?, FINANCIAL ADVISOR
(June 6, 2012), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/how-much-do-people-really-have-in-iras-10914
.html.
274. 401(k) plans can be backed by “generous employers who provide decent matching contri-
butions and additional funds to build your nest egg.”  John Wasik, Do You Have the Best or
Worst 401(k) Plan?, FORBES (July 23, 2014, 8:56 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/
2014/07/23/do-you-have-the-best-or-worst-401k-plan/ (a Forbes Contributor blog).  IRAs allow
individuals to make tax-deferred investments for retirement and are not tied to employment.
Individual Retirement Arrangements—Getting Started, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://
www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Individuals-Retirement-Arrangements—-Getting-Started  (last
visited Jan. 30, 2015) (“You can set up an IRA with a bank or other financial institution, life
insurance company, mutual fund, stockbroker.”).
275. Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Bears Patina of Bias, NAT’L L.J., June 17, 2013, at 4,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202604295415&slreturn=201310
15003926.
276. HOT COFFEE (HBO 2011).  In this film, an employee alleging that she was raped while
working as a defense contractor abroad chronicled her struggle to face her employer in court.
Id.  Her employment contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause, limiting her access to a
jury trial. Id.  Hot Coffee uses this case to show how “mandatory arbitration clauses are prolifer-
ating, nestled in the fine print of many employment contracts” and how this causes many Ameri-
cans to “give up their fundamental right to access the legal system, often without realizing it and
without choice.” HBO Documentaries Synopsis, HBO, http://www.hbo.com/documentaries/hot-
coffee/synopsis.html#/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
277. Goldhaber, supra note 275.
278. Id.
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tors can result in large corporations using an arbitration company on
multiple occasions as disputes arise.279  These arbitrators might fear
losing repeat business with these corporations if they make awards
and determinations that are unfavorable to the corporation.280  There
also might be some inherent bias in the familiarity the arbitration
company has with the corporation.  Additionally, because there is no
court-appointed legal assistance281 for arbitration proceedings, it is
plausible that employee beneficiaries will be greatly disadvantaged
(and may be unable to afford counsel) in contrast to the employer,
which has access to significant financial and legal resources.
Overall, it appears that there are significant legal and policy ratio-
nales for limiting the enforceability of arbitration clauses in ERISA
agreements.  Based on the analogy to trust law and the doctrine of
privity, courts should be hesitant to apply the broad acceptance of the
antitrust cases, Concepcion and Italian Colors, to ERISA fiduciary
breach suits.  Additionally, public policy does not support the expan-
sive use of these clauses in contracts.  As a result, courts should de-
cline to apply the holdings of Concepcion and Italian Colors to
ERISA in both the individual suit and class action contexts.
IV. IMPACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The recent trend at corporate law firms has been to include arbitra-
tion clauses in agreements, regardless of the size or sophistication of
either party.  Proskauer Rose LLP, a law firm with six hundred attor-
neys,282 issued a newsletter discussing the use of arbitration clauses:
Given the current state of the law, there appears to be enough of a
possibility to prevail on enforcing class waivers in arbitration agree-
ments that plan sponsors and fiduciaries should include them in
their arbitration agreements and plan documents if perceived to be
an advantage. Even if enforced, however, their impact remains un-
clear in light of the fact that, as mentioned, a single participant may
commence a lawsuit in a representative capacity under ERISA,
without resorting to the class action devices available under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.283
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. For a discussion on the use of court-appointed legal assistance, see William L. Dick, Jr.,
The Right to Appointed Counsel for Indigent Civil Litigants: The Demands of Due Process, 30
WM. & MARY L. REV. 627 (1989).
282. Proskauer Rose LLP—Firm Profile, MARTINDALE, http://www.martindale.com/Prosk
auer-Rose-LLP/law-firm-123738.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
283. Thomas E. Clark, It’s a Matter of When, Not If: Validity of Class Action Waivers in ER-
ISA Plans To Be Tested, FIDUCIARY MATTERS BLOG (May 19, 2013), http://blog.fraplantools
.com/erisa-arbitration-clauses-class-action-waivers/.
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As this statement suggests, practitioners are already shifting towards
including these kinds of waivers in ERISA agreements.  However, un-
certainty as to how courts will interpret arbitration agreements in ER-
ISA agreements will remain until courts come down one way or
another on the issue.
While firms such as Proskauer Rose are taking an active role in
trying to limit access to litigation through the use of arbitration
clauses, some companies are erring on the side of eliminating the
clauses until courts have determined whether or not the clauses are
enforceable. Charles Schwab Corporation, a brokerage account pro-
vider, has modified its account agreements284 “to eliminate the ex-
isting class action lawsuit waiver for disputes.”285  The company
further asserted that while it believed arbitration was the “best” way
to handle dispute resolution, it did not want to “leave clients with a
degree of uncertainty about their dispute resolution options in the
meantime” and elected to remove the clauses.286  While Charles
Schwab is not a direct ERISA plan provider, it manages the invest-
ments of ERISA plans.  Similarly, Fiduciary Risk Assessment LLC, an
ERISA plan consultant company, issued its own statement:
[W]e believe that after nearly 40 years of jurisprudence in the fed-
eral courts, ERISA offers a scheme of rules and regulations that
strongly attempts to balance the interests of both plan sponsor/fidu-
ciaries and plan participants, despite not being perfect all the time.
The creation of dueling venues of public resolution (courts) and pri-
vate resolution (arbitration) has great potential for unintended con-
sequences for all involved parties.287
This statement, while arguably hedged by public relations profession-
als, errs on the side of avoiding the waivers for fear of “unintended
consequences.”288
The actions of Proskauer Rose and Fiduciary Risk Assessment pro-
vide examples of the two common courses of action that plan provid-
ers can take.  Proskauer Rose’s approach is aggressive in its use of
arbitration agreements, which may help keep its clients out of court in
the case of a pension plan dispute.  In doing so, the firm also takes a
risk that the agreements and waivers will not be upheld in court or
that its client’s plan beneficiaries will lose faith in the plans.  Fiduciary
284. That is, investment management agreements that Charles Schwab has entered into with
ERISA plan providers.
285. Thomas E. Clark, It’s a Matter of When, Not If: Validity of Class Action Waivers in ER-
ISA Plans To Be Tested, FIDUCIARY MATTERS BLOG (May 19, 2013), http://blog.fraplantools
.com/erisa-arbitration-clauses-class-action-waivers/.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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Risk Assessment takes a more measured approach, waiting to see how
the courts (and perhaps its plan beneficiaries) come down on the issue
before using arbitration agreements.  Given the unsettled nature of
the law and the potential impact on employees who participate in ER-
ISA plans, Fiduciary Risk Assessment’s deference to the plan fiduci-
ary relationship is preferable.
B. Economic Impact
Arguably, given the lack of public or media attention to the chang-
ing landscape of the law surrounding arbitration agreements, the eco-
nomic impact of arbitration agreements on retirement plans will be
subtle.  Retirement plan documents are dense—they cannot be de-
scribed as “comprehensible” to average Americans.289  The compli-
cated plan documents, coupled with a general lack of information,
benefit employers—the less informed an employee is, the less likely
she is to take control of her retirement plan or notice plan
irregularities.
Theoretically, if employees were given more information about
their 401(k) plans, they might opt out of employer-sponsored retire-
ment accounts.  However, the benefits of employer-sponsored plans
are not necessarily outweighed by the detriments.  For example,
matching provisions290 are incredibly positive not only for the employ-
ees who remain for the vesting period, but also for the economy as a
whole.  The more employers that match, the more funds there are in
retirement accounts.  Further, retirement accounts are a huge portion
of the United States economy, and the size of these accounts directly
affects the health and stability of the United States financial system.
A study conducted by the National Institute on Retirement Security
(NIRS) suggests that state and local retirement plans contribute over
$358 billion in total economic output nationwide and generate over
$57 billion in federal, state, and local tax revenue.291  The NIRS study
289. This is evidenced by the fact that courts have described pension plan documents as “boil-
erplate,” “form,” and “standard.” See, e.g., Dugan v. R.J. Corman R.R. Co., 344 F.3d 662 (7th
Cir. 2003).
290. Ultimate Guide to Retirement: What Is a Matching Contribution?, CNN MONEY, http://
money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/401k_basics.moneymag/index9.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
Many 401(k) plans include matching contributions from the beneficiary’s employer. Id.  “The
match can often be 50 cents to a dollar for every dollar you contribute, up to a set maximum—
perhaps 3% to 6% of your salary, or in some cases a dollar limit.  The match is free money!” Id.
The matching funds serve to increase an employee’s income without increasing tax liability. Id.
However, matching funds typically take two to three years to “vest”—that is, an employee needs
to stay at the company for two to three years before the matched funds are officially “hers.” Id.
291. ILANA BOIVIE & BETH ALMEIDA, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC., PENSIONOMICS: MEASUR-
ING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS 1 (2009), available at http://
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demonstrates how pension benefits have a direct and indirect impact
on local and national economies.  In the example in the NIRS study, a
retired schoolteacher uses her pension money to buy a car.292  As a
result, the owner of the car dealership, the salesman who sold her the
car, and every company involved in the production of the car all see
an increase in income.293  That income not only benefits the govern-
ment by generating tax revenue, it also benefits the economy in
general.294
Arguably, there are two possible scenarios that would limit the eco-
nomic performance of retirement accounts due to contractual arbitra-
tion agreements.  First, employers could become less careful with
maintaining employment accounts because the fear of retribution in
the form of an individual or class suit is diminished when arbitration
agreements are enforced.  Second, informed employees might decide
that employer-sponsored retirement accounts are too risky if employ-
ers cannot be held accountable for breaches of their fiduciary duty in
court.  Both scenarios could leave a dent in the economy that could
have lasting effects.
The first scenario, while egregious, is not completely unimaginable.
As employers experience financial setbacks or even more nefarious
troubles (for example, the Enron collapse)295 retirement plans can be-
come an early casualty.296  If financially troubled companies knew that
they had arbitration agreements in place that would limit their legal
liability, they might treat employee retirement accounts less diligently.
If retirement accounts run dry due to corporate mismanagement or
negligence, and employees have limited recourse for obtaining recov-
ery, the overall economy will suffer because retirees will not be able to
make purchases.  This drop in economic activity could greatly limit
spending for a growing sector of the population.  This would certainly
create problems for the United States economy.
The second scenario also presents problems, although perhaps not
as serious as those related to employer misconduct.  If employees are
www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/Pensionomics%202009/nirs_2009_pensionomics_re
port_final.pdf.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 4.
294. Id. at 7.
295. For a discussion of the collapse of Enron and the ensuing havoc it wrecked on its employ-
ees’ pension plans, see Sharon Reece, Enron: The Final Straw & How to Build Pensions of Brick,
41 DUQ. L. REV. 69 (2002).
296. Dallas Salisbury, The Future of Retirement Plans, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/ad/
article/employeebenefits-future (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) (an advertisement produced in cooper-
ation with the Employee Benefit Research Institute and the International Foundation of Em-
ployee Benefit Plans).
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uncomfortable with keeping their retirement funds in accounts man-
aged by their employers, they can initiate their own investment ac-
counts.  This option maintains the pre-tax saving of funds in an
investment account,297 but lacks the beneficial employer-matching
provisions common to corporate retirement accounts.298  So, this solu-
tion reduces possible tax-free retirement income for retirees (which
could then be spent, stimulating the economy).  Additionally, if more
employees opt out of employer-sponsored retirement accounts, em-
ployees might not be able to take advantage of the investment man-
agement resources available to large corporations, which are often
costly.  As a consequence, individual retirement accounts might be-
come unstable or more poorly managed than corporate retirement ac-
counts.  Lastly, if employees continually reject employer-sponsored
retirement accounts, some employers might stop offering them alto-
gether.  Employer-sponsored plans are successful because they oper-
ate in the aggregate—arguably, the more funds in an account, the
more the funds can grow and appreciate. Pension plans (as compared
to individual investment accounts) also create economies of scale, al-
lowing for the more efficient use of investment resources, fund man-
agement, diversification, and risk allocation.299  If employers stopped
offering 401(k) plans to their employees, many workers would suffer
economic losses that translate directly into less money to be used dur-
ing retirement.
V. CONCLUSION
ERISA was implemented to protect employees by setting strict fi-
duciary guidelines for employers that offer retirement plans.  Under
ERISA, if employers breach their fiduciary duty to employees, they
can be held accountable in court.  Potentially, arbitration undermines
the strict fiduciary guidelines set forth in ERISA.  Limiting the ability
of employers to use arbitration clauses in their plan agreements will
level the balance of power between employers and employees.
By limiting the ability of employers to use arbitration clauses in
their plan agreements, courts will help re-establish this balance and
ensure that retirement accounts continue to be widely used and
297. IRAs and similar investment accounts preserve tax benefits to the taxpayer. Individual
Retirement Arrangements—Getting Started, supra note 274.
298. As discussed above, IRAs and investment funds are not associated with employers and as
such, are not matched by employers.
299. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Indus-
try: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151 (2007) (discussing economies of
scale and scope in funds).
812 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:773
trusted in the modern workplace.  Because of the direct ties between
retirement funds and economic stability, it is in society’s best interest
for courts to prohibit the enforcement of arbitration clauses.  Addi-
tionally, the use of arbitration clauses effectively limits potential liti-
gants’ direct access to court, offering them an alternative that is at best
questionable.
The recent line of Supreme Court cases supporting the use of arbi-
tration clauses under the FAA should not be applied in the ERISA
context.  ERISA plans, like traditional trusts, require a heightened
standard of responsibility to the plan beneficiary.  The use of arbitra-
tion would cut against the fiduciary duties of the plan provider to the
detriment of plan beneficiaries.  This erosion of ERISA would be a
huge blow to employees—a class of people with already diminished
negotiating power and rights.  It is the American worker who would
suffer.
For the reasons discussed in this Comment, it would be in the best
interest of the American workforce and economy for courts to refuse
to enforce single litigant and class action arbitration clauses in the ER-
ISA context.  It is up to the courts to maintain the quality and integ-
rity of the ERISA retirement plan by preserving access to courts for
employees with valid causes of action.  Whether or not this is the path
that courts will take is a question that remains to be answered, but it
will likely be addressed within the next few years as arbitration clauses
continue to enjoy vast proliferation in the American legal system.
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